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Monti vs Berlusconi)?
There are two sides in this debate. In the literature on speculative attacks, the fundamentalist view is associated to the rst generation models of balance of payment crises stemming from Krugman (1979) , where speculative attacks only hasten home the delivery of the bad news: economic fundamentals (monetary nancing of the scal decit) are incompatible with xed exchange rates. Similarly, in the sudden stops literature pioneered by Calvo (1998) , capital ow reversals due to unsustainable external positions trigger an abrupt current account reversal. More generally, this view suggests that in order to prevent such crise economic policies should directed at correcting structural imbalances with a view to long term growth. On the other side, the credibility view is based on the idea of multiple equilibria pioneered by the Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) model of bank runs, and popularized by Obstfeld's (1986) model of second generation speculative attacks. If market come to expect a future devaluation, they require higher interest rates to cover depreciation and this makes it optimal for the government to abandon the peg and depreciate to boost the economy, thus fullling markets' expectations. In this framework, a front loaded adjustment may enable the goverment to focus market expectations on the good equilibrium of low interest rates and sustainble currency peg. In other models market fundamentals and sunspots interact to generate multiple equilibria (see Alesina, Prati and Tabellini, 1989) . On the theory side, Morris and Shin in a series of contributions, see for example Morris and Shin 1998 , show that when agents information sets dier slightly, and each individual receives an idiosyncratic signal on market fundamentals, multiple equilibra collapse to a unique equilibrium, which is ultimately determined by market fundamentals: In the empirical literature, Goldstein's (1998) This paper tries to shed some light on these issues by looking at the empirical evidence on EU sovereigns CDS spreads. We estimate an econometric model, building on Bekaert et al. (2009) , where the crucial role is played by time varying parameters. We model CDS spread changes at country level as reecting three dierent factors: a Global sovereign risk factor, a European sovereign risk factor and a Financial intermediaries risk factor. Our main ndings are as follows. First, while the US subprime crisis aects all European sovereign risks, albeit with dierent magnitudes due to the role of nancial institutions in each country (Ireland, Austria and the UK being the most affected), the Greek crisis is largely a matter concerning the Euro Zone. Second, dierences in vulnerability to contagion in the Eurozone are remarkable: in particular France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Ireland and Portugal show large and recurrent spikes in idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, after the Greek crisis the core Eurozone members become less vulnerable to EUZ contagion, possibly due to a safe-heaven eect, while peripheric countries become more vulnerable.Third, market fundamentals go a long way in explaining these dierences. In fact, during crisis time, market fundamentals matter more than during normal times.
Variables such as the domestic debt GDP ratio, the growth rate of industrial production and the rate of unemployment which were largely irrelevant before the crisis, become important during the crisis. Also, changes in the country's sovereign rating, which were not statistically signicant in normal times, do aect idiosyncratic and contagion risk in crisis time, as markets scramble for new information. Market fundamentals jointly explain between 54 and 80% of the cross-country variation in idiosyncratic risks and in the vulnerability to contagion, largely supporting the view that fundamentals matter and that wake-up calls are delivered in times of crisis. It then follows that a front loaded, cold-turkey, adjustment which may be desirable for the purpose of improving credibility, may backre by imposing a heavy collateral damage to the economy.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant litera-5 ture on contagion. Section 3 presents the empirical model and our methodology. Here we discuss the data set, as well as the econometric issues involved in the approach. In Section 4 we present the results and discuss their interpretation. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
Review of the literature
The word contagion appears in the recent economic debate in the late nineties in the wake of the Mexican and Asian crises. While in the medical science contagion indicates the spread of a disease from one individual to another, in economics contagion has a narrower meaning. Dierent economies are tied by nancial and trade linkages, which are reered to as spillovers or channels of interdependence; contagion refers to the fact that in particular occasions, typically during economic crises, the transmission of economic shocks rises in intensity over and above what is justied by normal interdependence. In the simplest specication, consider two asset prices y s in two countries s =i, j, that are linked by a relationship of the form:
where the interdependence parameter β ij describes the eect of a change in country j's asset price on country i's price. In this framework contagion occurs if, during a crisis in country j, a structural break occurs in the β i parameter, which typically rises in absolute value, so that the movement in asset prices in country j is transimitted to country i with an unusual strenght.
Eichengreen Rose Wyplosz (1996) dene contagion as the probability that a crisis in a country at a point in time is correlated with the occurrence of a crisis in other countries, after controlling for the eects of political and economic fundamentals. A common approach to testing for contagion is based on the analysis of correlation coecients across asset returns. If the correlation in returns between assets in two markets increases signicantly during a crisis, this is interpreted as evidence of contagion. In possibly the rst major contribution to the literature, King and Wadhwani (1990) nd that the corre-6 lation between the U.S, U.K. and Japan increased signicantly after the U.S stock market crash ok 1987, see also Lee and Kim (1993) , Calvo and Reinhart (1995) , Baig and Goldfajn (1999) for an application to Asian and Latin American emerging markets. This approach was criticized by Forbes and Rigobon (1999, 2002) , who showed that the rise in asset price volatility during crises may per se raise the cross-country correlation without determining a change in the interdependence parameters β i of the underlying model (1), see also Boyer, Overall, they nd only small evidence of systematic contagion from US markets and from the global nancial sector to equity markets, but strong evidence of domestic contagion between assets of dierent sectors in the same country.
This latter methodological approach is particularly suitable for our purposes. 
where s it is the daily change in the CDS spread of country i as of time t . We assume an autoregressive process so that Φ(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L, in order to capture potential autocorrelation in spread changes. F t is a vector of three dierent factors, our interdependence channels, measuring Global, European and Financial risks; α it is the drift of the CDS spread daily change of country i at time t, ε it is the residual which we assume to be uncorrelated among countries. We model the parameters of each i-th country as follows:
where Z i,t−k is a vector of exogenous lagged control variables, primarly macroeconomic fundamentals at country level, which are expected to explain cross country dierences in the time varying coecients, CR t is a dummy variable that takes value 1 during the period of the Greek sovereign debt crisis and 0 otherwise.
denotes the vector containing the change in a global risk factor, F G , the change in a European risk factor, F E and the change in a nancial risk factor, F F (to be discussed below in more detail), and EUZ is a dummy variable that equals one for countries in the Eurozone and zero for countries outside.
Equation (2) is the standard Arbitrage Pricing Theory. Equation (3) In order to clean our measures of risk factors from these endogeneity prob- 
Estimation of the time-varying coecients
The rst step of the analysis consists in estimating the idiosyncratic (alpha) and contagion (beta) parameters of each country's spread, and in tracking their evolution overtime. To this end we estimate equation (2) (2) recursively by OLS, using ve lags of the dependent variable to capture possible autocorrelation inside each subsample, for a total of 1430 regressions and point estimates. We retrieve the coecients (alpha and betas) and we assigne them to the last observation of each subsample. The latter comprise standard macroeconomic, nancial variables and risk aversion indicators. In order to prevent the endogeneity problem that arises when stochastic shocks aect both the dependent (our estimated coecient) and the explanatory variables (the fundamentals ), we lag the latter by a quarter. We also need to address the issue of the dierent frequency of the observations.
While CDS spreads are observable on a daily basis, most macroeconomic variables are available only on a monthly, quarterly or annual basis. Moreover, for several of these variables, the most recent data for 2012 are unavailable. In order to address the rst problem we use linear interpolation to construct weekly observations from monthly, quarterly and annual observations, which means that we assume that macroeconomic variables evolve smoothly over time. For the second problem we replace the missing Eurostat data for 2012 with the AMECO macroeconomic forecasts.
We include a wide range of country-specic macroeconomic indicators: the public debt/GDP ratio, the budget decit/GDP ratio, the current account balance as percentage of GDP, the percentage change in industrial production. Also, we employ trade openess, exports plus imports scaled by GDP, as the trade channel has often been associated with international spillovers (see Equations (5) and (6) the vulnerability to the Global sovereign risk component, and. on the other, to the sensitivity to the European banks risks. This is most noticeble in Italy and Spain, two countries that between August and November, experienced severe attacks on the bond markets, leading to ECB massive interventions.
In Germany and Northern European countries, the interdependence with the nancial factor became signicant only later, in July 2011, at the time when a private sector involvement (PSI) agreement was included in the second bail-out package for Greece.
StepTwo: Explaining Contagion
In order to understand the reasons behind the dierent vulnerabilities to contagion, the betas, and to panic, the alphas, we use panel estimation. We regress our countries' time varying parameters on the respective (lagged) economic fundamentals (trade openness, the public debt/GDP ratio, the budget decit/GDP ratio, the current account balance as percentage of GDP, the rate of unemployment, the monthly change in industrial production), on the sovereigns' credit rating innovations, on an index of market volatility (the VIX), on a liquidity measure of the inter-bank market (the TED spread), a crisis dummy (which takes the value of one from November 2009, when the estimate for the Greek 2009 budget decit was raised from 5 to 12.7%) and on a Euro Zone dummy. We have excluded Greece from our sample, because this country is likely to be the source of systemic risk, so that its parameter estimates may aected by strong endogeneity problems. In fact, Greek alphas and betas take extreme values and should be considered as outliers which, if included, would probably bias our estimates. We report the results of the estimation in Tables 1-4. Alpha coecients. Table 1 that during the crisis this eect is magnied by an extra -1.1% so that the total eect in a crisis sums up to a reduction in the drift of 1.5%. The sign of direct eects of the signicant coecients conform to our a priori : the rate of growth in industrial production enters with a negative sign, so that a larger growth rate is associated to a lower idiosyncratic vulnerability; the ratio of the budget decit to GDP and the volatility index enter with positive sign, so they are both associated with higher sovereign risk drift. These are the only variable that show signicant direct eects on the sovereign risk drift: the other variables, the current account balance, the public debt ratio, the unemployment rate and trade openness, are not statistically dierent from zero. Things change quite dramatically during the crisis (see the η 1 coecients in the third column). First, we see that during a crisis the constant term of the equation turns positive and signicant. More interestingly, countries belonging to the EUZ (see the dummy coecient) have an additional vulnerability to idiosyncratic risks so that Euro-membership adds an extra 0,34% to the sovereign spread change relative to non EUZ members. Note that EUZ dummy was not statistically dierent from zero outside the crisis. Also, we see that the crisis amplies the eect of growth on the idiosyncratic risk component. Finally, observe that the ratio of debt to GDP, the rate of unemployment, and Moody's rating innovations, which had no signicant direct eect in normal times, become signicantly and positively associated to a country's idiosyncratic risk in the crisis. This suggests that while markets tend to ignore solvency measures, credit agencies' ratings and labor market developments in normal times, under period of stress these variable convey useful information on sovereign default risks. The same is true for trade opennes, possibly reecting the role of current account imbalances in countries such as Spain and Ireland. The conclusion here is that nancial markets which benignly neglected fundamentals, got a sudden wake up call with the crisis. It is important to point out that the corrected R 2 coecient shows that our macro-economic fundamentals can account for about 54% of the cross-country dierences in idiosyncratic sovereign 
where in the constant parameter we have introduced an Euro-Zone dummy (EZ) in order to control for xed eects at the Euro-Zone level. We reportnegative for EZ the β 1 and γ 1 coecients, which are the coecients on the Z i,t−k instruments that survive an encompassing approach of variable selection where each variable is kept in the regression if either the interdependence coecient β or the crisis parameter γ of a particular variable is statistically signicant. ***, **, and *, indicate statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. risk changes.
Beta Global Sovereigns. We saw that the parameter β
Glob , which represents a country's vulnerability to global sovereign risks, increases signicantly during the Greek crisis, albeit with dierent intensity, for almost all of the countries of the Eurozone, and in particular in the perifery (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland). It is therefore interesting to understand which macroeconomic imbalances are reponsible for this. In the model, it turns out that four variables have a signicant direct eects before the outset of the Greek debt crisis (see the rst column of Table 2 which reports the β 1 parameters in equa-tion 4): the public debt/GDP ratio (positive sign), the current account balance over GDP (negative sign), trade openess (positive sign), the EZ membership (negative sign). Interestingly, in normal times the global sensitivity is zero on average (see the constant term) but it is negative for EUZ members: the common currency shelters its members from global contagion relative to non members. However, during the crisis the EUZ dummy variable turns positive (and signicant) , making the total eect positive (-0.216859 + 0.585314). Euro membership makes countries more exposed to global contagion. As with the α coecients, the fourth column of Table 2 shows that the solvency indicator (public debt GDP ratio) becomes signicantly more important in explaining sensitivity to global contagion; the real macro fundamentals such as the rate of unemployment, the growth of industrial production, as well as the credit ratings and the VIX volatility index, which were not relevant in normal times, become statistically signicant with the expected sign during the crisis. Our variables toghether explain around 75% of the cross-country variation in the exposure to global sovereign risk.
Beta European Sovereigns. In Figure 4 we saw that the European contagion parameters β
Eur varied in a very narrow range before the crisis, but became much more diverse in the crisis, mainly reecting the dichotomy between the Euro-Zone core and perifery. Our empirical ndings in this section suggest that these developments largely reect an increased market sensitivity to macroeconomic fundamentals. Before the Greek crisis (see the second column of Table 3 ), the only economic variables which signicantly aect the European contagion parameters are the public debt/GDP ratio (with positive sign), the growth of industrial production (negative sign) , trade openess (also positive) and the volatility VIX index (positive). Interestingly, EUZ members are less vulnerable to European Sovereigns shocks than non EUZ countries.
The TED spread is strogly signicant but has the wrong (i.e negative) sign.
The landscape change dramatically during the crisis (see the fourth column).
Euro members become more vulnerable to European Sovereign contagion; the eect of the debt ratio and of the growth rate becomes larger, while that of the decit ratio smaller (its cumulative eect slightly shrinks to 0.0065 -0.0011);
Pooled OLS, using 2665 observations 
where in the constant parameter we have introduced an Euro-Zone dummy (EZ) in order to control for xed eects at the Euro-Zone level. We report the β 1 and γ 1 coecients, which are the coecients on the Z i,t−k variables that survive an encompassing approach of variable selection where each variable is kept in the regression if either the interdependence coecient β or the crisis parameter γ of a particular variable is statistically signicant. ***, **, and *, indicate statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
where in the constant parameter we have introduced an Euro-Zone dummy (EZ) in order to control for xed eects at the Euro-Zone level. We report the β 1 and γ 1 coecients, which are the coecients on the Z i,t−k instruments that survive an encompassing approach of variable selection where each variable is kept in the regression if either the interdependence coecient β or the crisis parameter γ of a particular variable is statistically signicant. ***, **, and *, indicate statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. the unemployment rate, rate and the VIX index start to matter, while the eect of trade openness disappears. Thus, as before, the crisis exacerbates the impact of the real economy on the contagion parameter. A particularly striking feature is the lessened role of the budget decit, as opposed to that of the debt:
this suggest that the European strategy focusing on decit reduction, rather than privatization and debt reduction, may backre in terms of risk premia if it is associated to a sharp reduction in the growth rate. Again, the t of the regression is encouraging: an R 2 close to 80%, implies that fundamentals can account for most of the cross-country variation in exposure to European contagion.
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Beta European Financial. As of July 2011, the sensitivity of sovereigns spreads to the European nancial sector risk has also increased, albeit not uniformly. For Ireland, Spain and Italy this is not surprising, as in the former two countries the bail-out costs of the banking sector has wrecked government nances, while Italian banks holds about one third of the government debt.
The econometric analysis delivers a few surprising results. From Table 4 we see that, once again, the crisis turns EUZ memberships from a source of resilience We have performed a roubustness check in order to make sure that our results do not depend on the orthogonalization ordering that we have assumed (Global-European-Financial). We have tried the Global-Financial-European ordering, by rst regressing our Financial index on the Global one and extracting the nancial innovation, and then by regressing the European sovereign β F in i,t = β 0 + β 1 Z i,t−k + γ i,t CRt + v i,t , γ i,t = γ 0 + γ 1 Z i,t−k where in the constant parameter we have introduced an Euro-Zone dummy (EZ) in order to control for xed eects at the Euro-Zone level. We report the β 1 and γ 1 coecients, which are the coecients on the Z i,t−k instruments that survive an encompassing approach of variable selection where each variable is kept in the regression if either the interdependence coecient β or the crisis parameter γ of a particular variable is statistically signicant. ***, **, and *, indicate statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. index on the Global index and the Financial innovation and using the residual as our pure European sovereign risk measure.The results of the analysis, available from the authors, are almost identical to the ones that we have presented. Table 5 summarizes our main ndings from a qualitative point of view. First, during the Greek crisis market sentiment shifts against the Eurozone countries: before the crisis there is evidence of a positive Eurozone eect, so that the common currency protected its members from sovereign idiosyncratic and contagion risks; however, the Euro membership becomes an handicap during the Greek crisis, which basically turns into a Euro issue: for given fundamentals EUZ countries see the perception of sovereign risk rise relative to countries non belonging to the Euro. Second, with the exception of the vulnerability to pure nancial risk, the role of the public debt ratio in accounting for both contagion and idiosyncratic risks is heightened during the crisis. Third, the real economy and the labor market become more important for sovereign risk during the crisis: lower growth of industrial production raises a country idiosyncratic and contagion risks, and higher unemployment, which was had no signicant association with sovereign risk before the crisis, becomes associated to higher CDS spreads changes and contagion. One possible interpretation is the political economy of scal and current account consolidation: high levels of unemployment make scal consolidations more dicult to implement and to sustain; high unemployment is a sign of downward wage rigidity, which is also an obstacle for restoring competitiveness. Fourth, credit rating news which do not aect sovereign spreads in normal times, have a signicant impact on sovereign risk during the crisis.
Summary and Conclusions
This evidence supports the conclusion that after a long period of benign neglect in the Eurozone, nancial markets have rediscovered that fundamentals and structural fragilities impeding growth matter for sovereign risk. Overall, the economic variables that we choose for assessing the role of market fundamentals go a long way in accounting for the cross-country variation in idiosyncratic and contagion risks: they can explain between 54 and 80% of the total cross-country variance.
These results have important implications for the appropriate pace of adjustment in the Euro area. First, they imply that credibility is not everything, in the sense that past economic fundamentals, as opposed to mere policy announcements, matter: they explain most of a country's vulnerability.
This implies that policies that plunge the economy into recession backlash (recall that Greece, the obvious example, is not part of our empirical analysis)
The reason it is not the standard story that the recession widens the public decit through the automatic stabilizers, and this worsens the country's sol- vency. The eect works via a direct link from lower employment and growth to spreads: the recession raises the perception of insolvency risk. Second, labor market reforms may backlash if they raise unemployment in the short run.
Measures aiming at reducing hiring and ring cost, for example, should be accompanied by reforms of the wage bargaining system in order to prevent the rise in unemployment. Third, privatizations should be part of a consolidation strategy, not only because they do not adversely aect the economy, but also because, by reducing debt stock, they may calm fears of insolvency which attach more weight to debt in the crisis 34
